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THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE CITIZENSHIP
OF NATIONAL BANKS FOR DIVERSITY
JURISDICTION PURPOSES UNDER 28 U.S.C.
§ 1348
Jill Holly*
I. INTRODUCTION
Jurisdiction in federal courts may be invoked if the action
is between "citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a
foreign state" and the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000.1
To maintain jurisdiction on this basis, there must be complete
diversity of citizenship, which requires that all parties on one
side of the controversy are citizens of a state to which all
parties on the other side are alien.2
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 13481 to define a national
bank's4 citizenship for jurisdictional purposes.' This statute
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1. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2000).
2. Id. In order to sustain complete diversity of citizenship when a
corporation is involved, the parties on one side of the controversy must be alien
both to the state where the corporation is incorporated and where it maintains
its principal place of business. Id. § 1332(c)(1).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (2000).
4. A national bank is an agency or instrument of the government created
for the purpose of providing a national currency secured by a pledge of United
States bonds. Davis v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 283-84 (1896). In the
early 1800's, state governments supervised banking. Comptroller of the
Currency, National Banks and the Dual Banking System 5 (2003),
http://www.occ.treas.gov/DualBanking.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2005). At that
time, each bank made loans by issuing its own notes, "which were designed to
be the new national currency that would hold a stable value and could be used,
reliably, across the nation." About the OCC: National Banking System Created
(1832-1864), http://www.occ.treas.gov/exhibits/histor3.htm (last visited Oct. 24,
2005). This required a bank examiner to certify that the bank held enough
currency to exchange the notes. Id. However, this did not always happen,
leaving many bank note holders with worthless paper. Id. In response to this
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states in relevant part: "[a]ll national banking associations
shall, for the purposes of all other actions by or against them,
be deemed citizens of the States in which they are
respectively located."6  Today there are over 1900 national
banks in the United States that have the ability to open a
branch in any state.7 This federal banking system poses
problems for courts in determining the citizenship of a
national bank with a principal place of business in one state,
but with branch banks spanning the country.'
Differing judicial interpretations of § 1348 have made it
unclear whether cases based solely on state law and involving
branch locations of a national bank may be removed to
federal court when diversity jurisdiction otherwise exists.9
problem, the National Bank Act created a federal national banking system, by
which a single currency was distributed and guaranteed by the government. Id.
This system is based on a federal bank charter, powers defined under federal
law, operation under federal standards, and oversight by a federal supervisor.
Comptroller of the Currency, supra, at 5. For a more detailed discussion of
national banks, see S. REP. No. 103-240 (1994).
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (providing the federal district courts with original
jurisdiction in civil actions commenced by the United States against a national
bank, any civil action to wind up the affairs of a national bank, and any action
by a national bank to enjoin the Comptroller of Currency).
6. Id. Section 1348 states in full:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
commenced by the United States, or by direction of any officer thereof,
against any national banking association, any civil action to wind up
the affairs of any such association, and any action by a banking
association established in the district for which the court is held, under
chapter 2 of Title 12, to enjoin the Comptroller of the Currency, or any
receiver acting under his direction, as provided by such chapter.
All national banking associations shall for the purposes of all other
actions by or against them, be deemed citizens of the States in which
they are respectively located.
Id.
7. See About the OCC, http://www.occ.treas.gov/aboutocc.htm (last visited
Nov. 1, 2005).
8. See generally Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414, 416 (4th
Cir. 2004) (determining the interpretation of § 1348 in light of the branch
banking system), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 2904 (U.S. June 13, 2005) (No. 04-
1186).
9. Compare Schmidt, 388 F.3d at 417 (holding that "located" includes
branch banks), and World Trade Ctr. Props., L.L.C. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,
345 F.3d 154, 161 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that defendant as a national bank is
deemed to be a resident in every state it has offices), with Horton v. Bank One,
N.A., 387 F.3d 426, 436 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that national banks are
"located" at their principal place of business), Firstar Bank, N.A. v. Faul, 253
F.3d 982, 993-94 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that "located" refers only to a bank's
principal place of business and the office listed in its organization certificate),
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Indeed, the federal courts of appeals are split on whether the
term "located," as used in § 1348, establishes the citizenship
of a national bank in every state in which it operates a
branch."° While two circuits have held that a national bank is
a resident of every state in which it operates a branch,11 the
remaining circuits that have addressed the issue have held
that, for diversity jurisdiction, a national bank is analogous to
a corporation.12 As a result, in these circuits, a national bank
has citizenship in both the state in which its principal place of
business is located and the state listed in its organization
certificate or articles of association.13 Until the Supreme
Court addresses the proper statutory interpretation of §
1348,14 the conflicting rules in the various circuits will induce
forum shopping 5 and may have a long-term impact on
national banks that use the federal forum, and its tendency to
apply greater scrutiny in the application of law to fact, as a
way to dilute state law claims'.16
and Am. Sur. Co. v. Bank of Cal., 133 F.2d 160, 161-62 (9th Cir. 1943) (holding
that a national bank is located in the state where it maintains its principal
place of business).
10. See cases cited supra note 9.
11. See Schmidt, 388 F.3d at 417; World Trade Ctr. Props., L.L.C., 345 F.3d
at 161.
12. See Horton, 387 F.3d at 436; Faul, 253 F.3d at 993-94; Am. Sur. Co., 133
F.2d at 161-62 (examining 28 U.S.C. §41(16), the predecessor statute of 28
U.S.C. § 1348 (2000)).
13. See Horton, 387 F.3d at 436; Faul, 253 F.3d at 993-94; Am. Sur. Co., 133
F.2d at 161-62. The articles of association specify in general terms:
[Tihe object for which the association is formed, and may contain any
other provisions, not inconsistent with law, which the association may
see fit to adopt for the regulation of its business and the conduct of its
affairs. These articles shall be signed by the persons uniting to form
the association, and a copy of them shall be forwarded to the
Comptroller of the Currency, to be filed and preserved in his office.
12 U.S.C. § 21 (2000).
14. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari and will review the issue in
its October 2005 term. See Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414 (4th
Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 2904 (U.S. June 13, 2005) (No. 04-1186).
15. Forum shopping has been criticized as being unfair because it may
subject the defendant to unanticipated and unforeseeable risks. See George D.
Brown, The Ideologies of Forum Shopping-Why Doesn't a Conservative Court
Protect Defendants?, 71 N.C. L. REV. 649, 666 (1993). "[T]he system frustrates
rational planning. Parties cannot know when they act what law governs their
behavior, for that depends upon post-act events such as the plaintiffs choice of
forum." Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for
Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 12 (1991). For more information
on forum shopping, see Brown, supra.
16. Lyle Washowich, National Banks Beware: Your Branches May Carry
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This comment will discuss the circuit split over the
meaning of the term "located" in § 1348 for determining
national bank citizenship and propose an interpretation for
adoption by the Supreme Court. First, because both sides of
the circuit split relied on canons of statutory interpretation,
this comment will give an overview of the basic principles of
statutory interpretation used in analyzing the federal
statute.17 Next, this comment will introduce the development
of § 1348 and the case law that has interpreted the statute.'"
After identifying the diverging interpretations of § 1348,"9
this comment will compare various court interpretations and
analyses of the statute with regard to national bank
citizenship and diversity jurisdiction. 0 Finally, this comment
will propose that a national bank should be treated as a
corporation for jurisdictional purposes, with its citizenship in
both the state of its principal place of business and the state
listed in its articles of association.2'
II. BACKGROUND
Underlying the conflict of the proper statutory
construction of the term "located" as used in § 1348 are
principles of statutory interpretation and the statute's
history. 22 To understand the legal issues surrounding the
term "located," it will be helpful first to consider the
principles of statutory interpretation and the development of
the statute and case law.
Greater Risk Than You Know, 122 BANKING L.J. 699, 700 (2005). Because of
the federal forum's stricter scrutiny in its application of law to fact, national
banks may reduce the worth of a plaintiffs state-law claim by removing it to
federal court via diversity jurisdiction. Id.; see discussion infra Part III.
17. See discussion infra Part II.A.
18. See discussion infra Part II.B-C.
19. See discussion infra Part III.
20. See discussion infra Part IV.
21. See discussion infra Part IV.
22. See Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414, 416 (4th Cir. 2004)
("Three traditional tools of statutory interpretation in combination ... confirm
'located' should be construed so as to render banking associations citizens of the
states in which they operate branch offices."), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 2904
(U.S. June 13, 2005) (No. 04-1186); Firstar Bank, N.A. v. Faul, 253 F.3d 982,
988 (7th Cir. 2001) (analyzing the statutory and jurisprudential history of §
1348 based on statutory interpretation principles).
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A. The Principles of Statutory Interpretation: An Overview
Courts have utilized differing tools of statutory
interpretation to determine the meaning of the term "located"
in § 1348.23 While a detailed discussion of the methods of
statutory interpretation exceeds the scope of this comment, it
is necessary to present a brief overview of the various
methods.
One of the most frequently used rules of statutory
interpretation is that the courts cannot interpret a statute
that is clear and unambiguous.2 4 Ambiguity arises when a
statute may be interpreted by reasonably well-informed
persons as having two or more different meanings.25 When a
statute is deemed ambiguous and interpretation of the
statute is necessary, the intent of the legislature must be
examined and the statute must be construed accordingly.26
To determine legislative intent, a court will use both
intrinsic and extrinsic aids.27 Intrinsic aids are those that
derive meaning from the internal structure of the text and
common dictionary meanings.28 Extrinsic aids, on the other
hand, are those outside of the statute itself, including the
legislative history and related statutes.29
1. Determining Legislative Intent Using Intrinsic Aids
Using intrinsic aids to interpret a statute involves
23. See discussion infra Part II.B.
24. See Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992).
Even remarks of the legislator sponsoring the bill "will not override the plain
meaning of a statute." 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:04 (6th ed. 2000) (citing United States v.
Tabacca, 924 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1991)).
25. 2A SINGER, supra note 24, § 46:04.
26. See 2A id. § 45:05 ("This rule has undergone numerous restatements,
rephrasings, and reformulations, but the essence of it [is] that the legislative
will governs decisions on the construction of statutes .. ").
27. See 2A id. § 45:14 (stating that resource material for statutory
construction are divided into "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" aids). "Extrinsic aids
generally are useful to decisions based on the intent of the legislature, while
intrinsic aids have greater significance for decisions based on the meaning of
the statute as understood by people in general." 2A id. (internal quotations
omitted). However, the use of intrinsic aids to interpret a statute has been
criticized in recent years as offering little help in the determination of the
legislative intent. See 2A id. "It has been fashionable in recent years to belittle
the worth of the rules and canons pertaining to the use of intrinsic aids." 2A id.
28. 2A id.
29. 2A id.
209
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examining the statute so that the meaning may be extracted
from its composition and structure." This includes exploring
elements such as punctuation," the title of the statute,32 the
statute's context,33 and the meaning of associated words in
the statute.3 4 For example, when two words that ordinarily
have similar meanings are grouped together in a statute, they
must be construed so that each word is given an independent
meaning. 5 Hence, intrinsic aids confine interpretation to the
four corners of the statute. 6
2. Determining Legislative Intent Using Extrinsic Aids
Sources used in statutory interpretation that are outside
the text of the statute are known as extrinsic aids.3 ' These
resources provide the necessary background information
relevant to determining legislative intent.8  A statute's
legislative history, for example, may provide important
insight into the purpose for its creation9.3  However, if the
history lacks any indication of the legislature's intended
interpretation, courts may assume that the legislature was
aware of then-existing statutes, rules of statutory
interpretation, and prior judicial decisions.4 °
Indeed, when a statute has a judicially interpreted
meaning, the Supreme Court has stated that courts should
not presume that the legislature overrules this established
interpretation when it reenacts the statute, unless the
30. See 2A id. § 47:01 (stating that a court undertaking the interpretation of
a statute should begin by reading and examining the text in order to draw
inferences of the meaning from its composition and structure).
31. See 2A SINGER, supra note 24, § 47:15.
32. See 2A id. § 47:03 (explaining that the title cannot control plain words of
the statute, but a court may consider it in resolving the meaning of an
ambiguous word).
33. See 2A id. § 47:02.
34. See 2A id. § 47:16 (asserting that if congressional intent is not clear, the
meaning of uncertain words may be determined by reference to other associated
words and phrases).
35. See 2A id.
36. See 2A id. § 47:01.
37. 2A SINGER, supra note 24, § 48:01
38. See 2A id. ("Extrinsic aids consist of background material about the
circumstances which led to the enactment of a statute, events surrounding
enactment, and developments pertinent to subsequent operation.").
39. See 2A id. § 48:02. The events occuning prior to the time when an act
becomes law is an instructive source that may indicate what the legislature's
intent might have been. 2A id. § 48:04.
40. See 2A id. § 45:12.
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legislature does so by express declaration.41  As such,
reenacting a statute without any change in its language
indicates legislative approval of judicial interpretations
established prior to the reenactment. 2 Accordingly, if a court
must choose between two possible interpretations of a
statute, considerable weight will be given to the prior judicial
interpretation.43
In addition, the statutory canon in pari materia44 may
also be used when there is no indication of intent in the
legislative history.4" Under this canon, a court may assume
that when two statutes use the same vocabulary to discuss
the same or similar subject matter, the legislature intended
the terms to have the same meaning.46 "[I]t proceeds upon
the supposition that the several statutes were governed by
one spirit and policy, and were intended to be consistent and
harmonious in their several parts and provisions. "47
B. The Statutory and Jurisprudential History of § 1348
National banks are organized under federal law pursuant
to the National Banking Act 48 and, consequently, are not
incorporated under any state. 49 Because they lack a state of
41. Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 389 (1943) ("We think if Congress
had passed or intended to pass an Act challenging as well known constitutional
decision of this Court there would be at least one clear statement of that
purpose either from its proponents or its adversaries.").
42. See id.
43. See 2A SINGER, supra note 24, § 45:12 ("When the court must choose
between equally plausible interpretations of ambiguous statutory language...
[a] long standing interpretation of a statute should be accorded considerable
weight.").
44. Latin for "in the same matter." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 807 (8th ed.
2004).
45. See 2A SINGER, supra note 24, § 45:12.
46. See 2A id. § 46:05. However, the fact that two statutory provisions
contain similar or identical language does not automatically render them
subject to the same interpretation. 2A id. The legislative history, the purpose,
and the context of the legislation must also be considered. See 2A id.
47. 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 103 (2001).
48. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 22-24 (2000).
49. See Amy L. Levinson, Developments in the Law: Federal Jurisdiction
and Forum Selection: Developments in Diversity Jurisdiction, 37 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1407, 1427 (2004). Under M'Culloch v. Maryland, in which the Supreme
Court precluded states from controlling the powers of entities created under
federal law, national banks may not incorporate in any state because they are
federally chartered entities under the National Bank Act. See Comptroller of
the Currency, supra note 4, at 5.
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incorporation, national banks do not fall under the same
definition of "citizens" as corporations under 28 U.S.C. §
1332(c)(1). 50  Section 1332(c)(1) provides that, for diversity
jurisdiction, a corporation is a citizen of both the state where
it has its principal place of business and its state of
incorporation. 51 Because they are not corporations governed
by § 1332(c)(1), Congress codified a national bank's
citizenship for jurisdictional purposes with § 1348.52
1. Section 1348's Predecessors and the Supreme Court's
Determination of the Congressional Intent Behind
the Statute.
Codification of a national bank's citizenship for
jurisdictional purposes began with the Acts of 1863 3, 1882, 54
and 1887.11 The Act of 1863 was the first comprehensive
statute regulating national banks.56 It gave national banks
general corporate powers, including the right to sue and be
sued in federal court.5 7  Approximately twenty years later,
50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (2000). "The location of a national bank for
corporate status purposes under the National Bank Act and other banking laws
is determined by the place where the national bank's main office is located."
Comptroller of the Currency, Interpretive Letter #952, at 2 (Oct. 23, 2002),
http://www.occ.treas.gov/interp/feb03/int952.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2005).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). Congress intended for this double citizenship
test to reduce the number of diversity jurisdiction cases in the federal courts as
a means of easing the workload of federal judges. See Egan v. Am. Airlines,
Inc., 324 F.2d 565, 566 (2d Cir. 1963); Kelly v. U.S. Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 850,
852 (3d Cir. 1960); S. REP. NO. 85-1830 (1958), as reprinted in 1958
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099-100. The "principal place of business" provision was thought
necessary to remedy the situation where a local operation had complete diverse
citizenship because it was incorporated in another state. Egan, 324 F.2d at 566.
52. See 28 U.S.C. § 1348.
53. Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, § 1, 12 Stat. 665.
54. Act of July 12, 1882, ch. 290, § 4, 22 Stat. 162, 163.
55. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 4, 24 Stat. 552, 554, amended by Act of
Aug. 13, 1888, ch. 866, § 25, 25 Stat. 433, 436.
56. See Comment, Expanding Concepts of Federal Jurisdiction Over
National Banks, 59 IOWA L. REV. 1030, 1034 (1974) The Act stated in relevant
part: "[Sluits, actions, and proceedings by and against any association under
this act may be had in any circuit, district, or territorial court of the United
States held with-n the district in which such association may be established."
Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, § 59, 12 Stat. 681.
57. Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, §§ 11-12, 12 Stat. 668. After the enactment
of this statute, commentators thought that federal courts might have exclusive
jurisdiction over suits involving national banks because nothing in the provision
provided for state jurisdiction. See Comment, supra note 56, at 1035. However,
when the statute was reenacted in 1864, it added concurrent state and federal
jurisdiction. See Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 57, 13 Stat. 99, 116-17. This did
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Congress enacted the Act of 1882, providing that "the
jurisdiction for suits hereafter brought by or against any
association established under any law providing for national-
banking associations... shall be the same as, and not other
than, the jurisdiction for suits by or against banks not
organized under any law of the United States .... This
statute established that a national bank is subject to the
same jurisdictional requirements as state banks or other
corporations, thus eliminating the Act of 1863's codification of
federal jurisdiction of national banks solely on the basis of
their federal charter.59
Unlike the previous two statutes, the Act of 1887 has a
direct bearing on where a national bank is "located" because
it expressly defines national bank citizenship using language
similar to that presently found in § 1348: "[Aill national
banking associations established under the laws of the United
States shall, for the purposes of all actions by or against
them ... be deemed citizens of the States in which they are
respectively located .. ."" In Petri v. Commercial National
Bank,62 the Supreme Court interpreted the Act of 1887 as
prescribing that national banks could resort to federal
tribunals under the same circumstances as would a
corporation or individual citizen.63 The Court stated that
"[nlo reason is perceived why it should be held that
[C]ongress intended that national banks should not resort to
federal tribunals as other corporations and individual citizens
might."'64 As such, the Act of 1887 treated national banks and
corporations as similar for jurisdictional purposes.65
not end the confusion, as the revised statutes of 1873 again left out concurrent
state jurisdiction. See Comment, supra note 56, at 1035. Subsequently, the Act
of February 18, 1875, reinstated concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over
any action arising under the National Bank Act. See Act of Feb. 18, 1875, ch.
80, 18 Stat. 316, 320.
58. Act of July 12, 1882, ch. 290, § 4, 22 Stat. 162, 163.
59. See id. In Leather Manufacturers' Bank v. Cooper, 120 U.S. 778, 780
(1887), the Supreme Court interpreted the 1882 Act as putting national banks
on the same footing as state banks for jurisdictional purposes. The Court
asserted that national banks could no longer remove suits to federal courts
merely on the ground that they are federal corporations. Id. at 780-81.
61. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 4, 24 Stat. 554.
62. Petri v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 142 U.S. 644 (1892).
63. See id. at 650-51.
64. Id.
65. Id. This addition to the Act of 1887 has been consistently interpreted by
the Supreme Court to maintain jurisdictional parity between national banks
213
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2. The Current Circuit Split over the Meaning of the
Term "Located" in § 1348
Although the Act of 1887 expressly defined a national
bank's citizenship for jurisdictional purposes, current law is
unclear about whether a national bank is "located" in every
state in which it has a branch.66 Five circuit courts have
addressed the issue with divided results.67  The Ninth,
Seventh, and Fifth Circuits held that a national bank is
"located" in both the state in which it has its principal place of
business and the state listed in either its organization
certificate or articles of association. Conversely, the Second
and Fourth Circuits concluded that a national bank is a
citizen in every state in which it operates a branch. 9
i. "Located" Means Principal Place of Business
The Ninth Circuit was the first to address whether a
national bank is "located" within a state by virtue of a branch
location, consequently destroying diversity jurisdiction. ° In
American Surety Co. v. Bank of California, a New York
corporation and an Oregon resident brought suit against a
national bank operating a branch in Oregon. 71 The court held
that under § 1348's predecessor, a national bank is "located"
only in the state of its principal place of business.72 In doing
so, the court compared a national bank to a corporation and
concluded there was no reason to treat the two differently and
depart from the general rule that the term "located" refers to
the principal place of business.78
and state banks, or other corporations. See Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau,
371 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1963) (stating that the Act of 1887 limited national banks'
access to federal courts to the same access enjoyed by state banks); Petri, 142
U.S. at 650-51.
66. See discussion supra Part I.B.
67. See cases cited supra note 9.
68. See cases cited supra note 12.
69. See cases cited supra note 11.
70. See Am. Sur. Co. v. Bank of Cal., 133 F.2d 160, 161-62 (9th Cir. 1943)
(explaining that for the pwrpose of determining jurisdiction in the case, the
citizenship of the national bank depended upon interpretation of 28 U.S.C. §
41(16), which preceded § 1348, and that "[nlo case defining 'located'... ha[d]
come to [the court's] attention").
71. See id. at 161.
72. See id. at 162.
73. See id. ("There would appear to be a close analogy between such a bank
and a corporation national in scope.").
214 [Vol: 46
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Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in Firstar Bank, N.A. v.
Fau74 held that for purposes of § 1348, a national bank is
"located" in both the state where it maintains its principal
place of business and the state listed in its organization
certificate.75 In Faul, a national bank with its principal place
of business in Ohio and branch locations in Illinois filed a
breach of contract suit against two defendants, both citizens
of Illinois.76 The court stated that Congress's intent in
enacting § 1348 was to put national banks on the same
footing as state banks and corporations for jurisdictional
purposes.77 It concluded that national banks would be on
equal footing with state banks and corporations if a national
bank was a citizen of both the state listed in its organization
certificate and the state of its principal place of business.7"
Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit in Horton v. Bank One Corp.79
adopted Faul's holding and rationale."0
ii. "Located" Means Every State with a Branch
A circuit split was created when the Second and Fourth
74. Firstar Bank, N.A. v. Faul, 253 F.3d 982 (7th Cir. 2001).
75. Id. at 994.
76. Id. at 984.
77. Id. at 988.
78. Id. at 993-94 (stating that because a national bank is analogous to a
corporation, but is not incorporated in any state, the state listed in its
organization certificate serves as an adequate substitute to the state of
incorporation).
79. Horton v. Bank One Corp., 387 F.3d 426 (5th Cir. 2004) (involving a
Texas resident who sued a national bank with branches in Texas over a retail
installment contract).
80. See id. at 429 ("We follow [Faul's] holding that a national bank is not
'located' in, and thus not a citizen of, every state in which it has a branch.").
The Fifth Circuit additionally held that the national bank is also a citizen of the
state listed in its articles of association, thus agreeing with the Office of the
Comptroller of Currency and a district court in Alabama. Id. at 436. The Fifth
Circuit noted that following Faul, the Office of the Comptroller of Currency
issued an interpretive letter indicating its support for the fundamental
reasoning in Faul, but added that a "more thorough articulation" of the
citizenship of a national bank would be based on its principal place of business
and the state of both its organization certificate and articles of association. Id.
at 431 n.26; Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 50, at 2. This rationale
was also adopted by an Alabama district court in Evergreen Forest Products. of
Georgia, L.L.C. v. Bank of America, N.A., 262 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1307 (M.D. Ala.
2003) (holding that the state listed in a national bank's articles of association
more accurately indicates a bank's true location for establishing citizenship
because a bank must amend its articles of association if it moves location,
unlike its organization certificate).
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Circuits held that for jurisdictional purposes, a national bank
is a citizen of every state in which it operates a branch
location.81  In World Trade Center Properties, L.L.C. v.
Hartford Fire Insurance, Co., the Second Circuit gave no
rationale for its holding beyond stating that, "[dlefendant
Wells Fargo is a national bank.., and by statute is deemed
to be a citizen of every state in which it has offices." 2 On the
other hand, in Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, the Fourth
Circuit largely based its holding on various canons of
statutory interpretation and the Supreme Court's
interpretation of "located" in a parallel statute in Citizens &
Southern National Bank v. Bougas.3
In Bougas, the Supreme Court addressed whether a
national bank is "located" in a county in which it operates a
branch, within the meaning of the former version of the
national bank venue statute.84 The Court stated that because
the venue statute used both "established" and "located," the
words were distinct and had to be given different meanings. 5
It declined to define "established."8 6 However, the Court held
that for purposes of venue under 12 U.S.C. § 94, a national
bank is "located" in any county in which it has a branch.8
81. World Trade Ctr. Props., L.L.C. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 345 F.3d 154,
161 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that the defendant national bank was a citizen of
every state in which it had offices); Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d
414, 417 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 2904 (U.S. June 13, 2005) (No.
04-1186).
82. See World Trade Ctr. Props., L.L.C., 345 F.3d at 161.
83. See Schmidt, 388 F.3d at 416 (stating that three traditional tools of
statutory interpretation were used to render its holding: the ordinary meaning
of "located," the juxtaposition of "located" with a contrasting term in the
preceding sentence of § 1348, and the Supreme Court's interpretation of
"located" in Citizens and Southern National Bank v. Bougas, 434 U.S. 35
(1977)).
84. Bougas, 434 U.S. at 35. The venue statute at issue in Bougas states:
[Aictions and proceedings against any association under this chapter
may be had in any district or Territorial court of the United States held
within the district in which such association may be established, or in
any State, county, or municipal court in the country or city in which
said association is located having jurisdiction in similar cases.
Rev. Stat. § 5198 (determining in which district a suit may be brought),
amended by Act of Feb. 18, 1875, ch. 80, § 1, 18, pt. 3 Stat. 316, 320 (current
version at 12 U.S.C. § 94 (2000)).
85. Bougas, 434 U.S. at 44.
86. However, the Court stated that the lower federal courts unanimously
held that, under § 94, a national bank is "established" in the federal district
encompassed by the place specified in the bank's charter. Id. at 39.
87. Id. at 44. The Court stated that "[there is no enduring rigidity about
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Thus, Bougas provided a significant basis for the Fourth
Circuit's conclusion that under § 1348, a national bank is
"located" in every state in which it operates a branch. 5
In Schmidt, a national bank operating branch locations
in South Carolina filed a motion to compel arbitration against
a resident of that state. 9 The Fourth Circuit based its
analysis on various tools of statutory interpretation.90 First,
the court used dictionary definitions and found that the term
"located" is not ambiguous and has an ordinary meaning of
"physical presence."91  It reasoned that because branch
locations are physically present in a state, a national bank is
deemed "located" in any state in which it has a branch. 92
Next, invoking Bougas, the Fourth Circuit concluded that
because the statute uses the two similar terms "established"
and "located," they must be given different meanings.
"Established" was interpreted more narrowly, referring only
to the charter location, while "located" was given a broader
definition that included branch locations.94 Finally, under the
in pari materia canon,95 the Fourth Circuit stated that
because § 1348 and the former venue statute refer to similar
the word 'located.'" Id. In enacting the venue statute, Congress was concerned
with an inconvenient interruption of a national bank's business if compelled to
produce documents for distant litigation. Id. However, that concern is not as
relevant "when the venue of a state-court suit coincides with the location of an
authorized branch." Id. The venue statute was amended in 1983 to allow only
suits brought in the district in which the national bank maintains its principal
place of business. See 12 U.S.C. § 94 (2000).
88. See Schmidt, 388 F.3d at 418 ("The Supreme Court's decision in
[Bougas] gives authoritative support to our reliance on the ordinary meaning of
'located' in section 1348.").
89. See id. at 415.
90. See id. at 416.
91. Id. at 416-18 ("It is an axiom of statutory interpretation that the plain
meaning of an unambiguous statute governs, barring exceptional
circumstance."). If the statute does not provide an express definition for the
term in question, it should be construed in accordance with its ordinary
meaning. Id.
92. Id. at 417.
93. See id. at 418-19.
94. Schmidt, 388 F.3d at 419. The court stated that the Supreme Court in
Bougas attributed the same two definitions to "established" and "located." Id. at
419-20. However, the Court in Bougas specifically stated that although the
lower federal courts have unanimously held "established" only to encompass the
place specified in the bank's charter, "we have no occasion here to review these
rulings." Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank i.. Bougas, 434 U.S. 35, 39-40 (1977).
95. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
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subject matter,96 the term "located" in § 1348 should mimic
that of the former venue statute as interpreted by Bougas"
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
The circuit split over § 1348 creates uncertainty for all
national banks that have branches in multiple jurisdictions,
particularly those in the Second and Fourth Circuits.98
Because national banks in the Second and Fourth Circuits
will have to resort increasingly to state courts, they may
receive inconsistent and contradictory decisions under state
and federal law, based only on the circuit in which the suit
was filed. 99 Consequently, this will dramatically increase
forum shopping and may have serious consequences for
national banks. 10 These organizations often take advantage
of the federal forum's tendency to apply greater scrutiny in
the application of law to fact, and as a result, national banks
use the federal forum as a way to dilute the value of state law
claims. 10 1 In addition, plaintiff counsel's' view of the value to
assign a given case will vary depending on whether it is in
the federal or state forum. 102 The conflict among courts and
its consequences demonstrate the need for a fixed and
accepted statutory interpretation of § 1348 in national bank
diversity jurisdiction cases. 10 3
Both sides of the circuit split agree that the debate over
whether to extend the citizenship of a national bank to every
state in which it operates a branch centers on the proper
statutory interpretation of § 1348.104 The Fourth Circuit
reasons that the term "located" in the statute has a plain and
ordinary meaning of "physical presence,"0 5 while the Fifth
and Seventh Circuits assert that the term is ambiguous and
96. See Schmidt, 388 F.3d at 422 (stating that both statutes relate to the
location of national banking associations in relation to their capacity for suit).
97. Id.
98. See Washowich, supra note 16, at 700, 702-03.
99. Id. at 702-03.
100. See id. at 700, 702-03. The federal forum is also less likely to have a
bias in favor of the "hometown" plaintiff. Id. at 700.
101. Id. at 700.
102. Id. The federal forum also plays a significant role in creating uniform
rules applicable to national banks. Id.
103. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 22.
105. Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414, 432 (4th Cir. 2004), cert.
granted, 125 S. Ct. 2904 (U.S. June 13, 2005) (No. 04-1186).
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that Congress intended national and state banks, as well as
other corporations, be placed on equal footing for
jurisdictional purposes.1°6 The remainder of this comment
will analyze the arguments on both sides of the circuit split
and propose an interpretation for adoption by the United
States Supreme Court. °7
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Is the Term "Located" in § 1348 Ambiguous?
It is an axiom of statutory interpretation that the
ordinary meaning of an unambiguous statute controls unless
Congress has provided an express definition.10 8 The Supreme
Court has stated that "the meaning of the statute must, in
the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act
is framed, and if it is plain,... the sole function of the courts
is to enforce it according to its terms."0 9 The Fourth Circuit
concluded that when the term "located," as defined by
dictionary definitions, is analyzed in its plain and ordinary
meaning in light of both § 1348 and the former venue statute,
it is unambiguous."0 The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand,
concluded that the term "located" in § 1348 has an ambiguous
dictionary definition and, consequently, analyzed the term's
statutory and jurisprudential history."' The findings of both
sides have merit, but the more persuasive conclusion is that
the term "located" in § 1348 is ambiguous.
1. The Dictionary Definitions of the Term "Located"
The Fourth Circuit, which based its holding in large part
on the conclusion that the term "located" in § 1348 is
unambiguous, began its analysis by examining dictionary
definitions.1  It cited Black's Law Dictionary, which
emphasized that the term "located" meant "physical
106. Horton v. Bank One, N.A., 387 F.3d 426, 429-32 (5th Cir. 2004); Firstar
Bank, N.A. v. Faul, 253 F.3d 982, 987-89 (7th Cir. 2001).
107. See discussion infra Parts IV, V.
108. See Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 476 (1992).
109. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
110. See Schmidt, 388 F.3d at 416-25.
111. See Faul, 253 F.3d at 987-89.
112. See Schmidt, 388 F.3d at 416-18.
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presence.""11  The court stated that "[i]n ordinary parlance,
the word 'located' is a general term referring to physical
presence in a place.""' Thus, it concluded that the term
"located" was unambiguously defined as any place in which a
national bank is physically present, including any state in
which it operates a branch office.115
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit concluded that because
the term "located" has numerous vague and unhelpful
dictionary definitions, the term is ambiguous in § 1348.116
The court found that "locate" could be defined as "to
determine or indicate the place of' or "to fix or establish in a
place." 7 The existence of multiple definitions does not lead
to a consistent interpretation of the statute because the
relevant inquiry regarding the meaning of the term "located"
refers to ""the number or scope of places where a national
bank is fixed or established."1 '
In view of the vagueness of these definitions, the Seventh
Circuit's conclusion is superior to that of the Fourth
Circuit." 9 Under each definition, it is possible that a national
bank's principal place of business, the state named in its
organization certificate, the state named in its articles of
association, and any state in which a branch is located, could
fulfill the defining parameters. 120 Given these possibilities, it
113. Id. at 417 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 940 (6th ed. 1990))
("Moreover, the sixth edition of Black's Law Dictionary, one of the few sources to
consider the past participle "located" separately as a general term, emphasized
the connotation of physical presence."). The most recent edition of Black's Law
Dictionary defines "location" as the "specific place or position of a person or
thing." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 958 (8th ed. 2004).
114. Schmidt, 388 F.3d at 416. The court also cited Webster's Third New
World Dictionary's definition of "locate" as "to set or establish in a particular
spot or position," and "location" as "a position or site occupied or available for
occupancy." Id. at 416-17 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD, NEW WORLD DICTIONARY
1327(1993)).
115. Id. at 417.
116. Faul, 253 F.3d at 987.
117. Id. (citing THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1026 (4th ed. 2000);
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW WORLD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1327 (1993); 8 THE
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1081 (2d ed. 1989)).
118. Id.
119. See id. ("Unfortunately, such definitions do not provide much aid in our
inquiry-what we are trying to determine is the number and scope of places
where a national bank is fixed or established.").
120. See Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414, 434 (4th Cir. 2004)
(King, J., dissenting) ("In this proceeding, 'located' could refer either to
Wachovia's principal place of business (North Carolina), to the place named in
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is evident that reasonably well-informed persons could differ
as to the meaning of the term"" in § 1348, creating
ambiguity.1 21
2. The Context of§ 1348 and a Parallel Venue Statute
In addition to dictionary definitions, the Fourth and
Seventh Circuits also compared the use of the term "located"
in § 1348 and the former venue statute. Both courts used this
dichotomy to support their respective positions that the term
"located" is ambiguous121 or has an ordinary meaning of
"physically present."123
The Fourth Circuit stated that the framework of § 1348,
which uses both "established" and "located," strengthened its
finding that "located" must be given a broad interpretation
that includes branch locations. 12 4  The court reasoned that
because the principles of statutory interpretation require that
different words used in the same statute be assigned different
meanings, "located" may be given its ordinary and broad
"1125Tncnrdefinition of "physical presence. In contrast, "established,"
which designates an original and permanent location, must
refer to the state in which a national bank' has filed its
charter. 126 However, this argument is weakened by the
Seventh Circuit's contention that this tool of statutory
interpretation can also be complied with if the term
"established" is defined as the state listed in a national bank's
charter and "located" is defined as the bank's principal place
of business. 127
its certificate of organization (North Carolina), or to any state in which
Wachovia has established branch offices (such as South Carolina)."), cert.
granted, 125 S. Ct. 2904 (U.S. June 13, 2005) (No. 04-1186).
121. 2A SINGER, supra note 24, § 46:04.
122. See Faul, 253 F.3d at 987 (stating that the Court in Bougas found the
term "located" ambiguous).
123. See Schmidt, 388 F.3d at 418-25. The Fourth Circuit stated that "[tihe
Supreme Court's decision in [Bougas] gives authoritative support to our reliance
on the ordinary meaning of 'located' in section 1348." Id. at 418. The court also
looked at the internal structure of the statute to give meaning to the term
"located" by juxtaposing it with another word in the statute. See id. at 418-20.
124. See id. at 418-19.
125. See id.
126. See id. The court relied on Webster's Third New International
Dictionary's definition of "'establish' as 'to place, install, or set up in a
permanent or relatively enduring position...." Id. at 419 (citing WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 778 (1993)).
127. See Faul, 253 F.3d at 992.
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The Fourth Circuit further bolstered its view that the
term "located" has an ordinary meaning of "physical
presence" by applying the statutory interpretation canon in
pari materia.28 In doing so, the court juxtaposed the subject
matter and context of § 1348 to that of the venue statute at
issue in Bougas, in which the Supreme Court interpreted the
term "located" to mean anywhere a branch is located.129 The
Fourth Circuit stated that because the two statutes refer to
the same subject matter - the location where a national bank
may sue and be sued - the term "located" in § 1348 should be
construed consistently, such that it includes any location in
which a branch bank is operated. 130
However, the in pari materia canon has "little persuasive
value" in this context because the purposes of the underlying
laws are not the same. 131 The Seventh Circuit found that the
underlying purpose of the venue statute is to limit the costs to
those involved in litigation.132 In contrast, the purpose behind
diversity jurisdiction is to minimize potential bias against
out-of-state parties. 33 Since a closer examination of the two
statutes reveals that their respective subject matter is only
superficially related, the Fourth Circuit's use of the in pari
materia canon does not strengthen its finding that a national
128. See Schmidt, 388 F.3d at 421-22. For a discussion of the statutory
interpretation canon in pari materia, see supra notes 44-47 and accompanying
text.
129. See id. at 421 (citing Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Bougas, 434 U.S. 35, 44
(1977)).
130. Id. at 422 ("Since the Supreme Court in Bougas provided the definitive
construction of those terms in the venue statute, the in pari materia canon
directs us to adopt the same construction for the jurisdiction statute.").
131. See Faul, 253 F.3d at 990-91. Courts have refused to apply the canon
when the statutory purposes of the law vary. Id. at 990 (citing United States v.
Ganderson, 511 U.S. 39, 50-51 (1994) (refusing to apply the in pari materia
canon to the supervised release revocation prescription and the probation
revocation proviso because supervised release, in contrast to probation, is not a
punishment in lieu of incarceration); Fort Stewart Schs. v. FLRA, 495 U.S. 641,
647-48 (1990) (refusing to apply in pari materia in a wages and fringe benefits
case to the National Labor Relations Act and the Postal Reorganization Act
because they deal with labor-management relations in entirely different fields
of employment)).
132. Id. "Venue rules give defendants some control over the place of trial.
Otherwise plaintiff could file suit in some remote district where it might be
unreasonably burdensome to defend. The venue rules thus balance the
conveniences of the parties with other policy factors in selecting an appropriate
forum for trial." JUDGE WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE
GUIDE: FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 4:2 (2005).
133. Faul, 253 F.3d at 990-91.
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bank is "located" in every state in which it has a branch.13 4
Beyond its in pari materia analysis, the Fourth Circuit
relied significantly on the Supreme Court's Bougas decision to
support its conclusion that the term "located" is
unambiguous. 135 However, the Fourth Circuit overlooked the
dicta in Bougas declaring that the term "located" in the
former venue statute has "no enduring rigidity," while the
Fifth and Seventh Circuits took heed of this statement.
' ' ' ' '
'
36
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Bougas found the term
"located" ambiguous and, consequently, proceeded to address
the congressional intent behind its enactment.1 37 Accordingly,
a stronger argument can be made for the ambiguity of the
term "located" in § 1348 because it has "no enduring
rigidity,' 3 and, thus, congressional intent must control its
meaning. 39
B. What Was Congress's Intent in Enacting § 1348?
If a statutory word or phrase is ambiguous, the court
must ascertain the interpretation that best fits the scheme
and general purpose intended by Congress.140  Because the
Fifth and Seventh Circuits found the term "located"
ambiguous, congressional intent formed the basis of both
courts' conclusion that a national bank is a citizen in the state
134. See generally id. at 990-91. The Fourth Circuit also argued that even if
the statutes were not treated as in pari materia, the venue statute is still
persuasive evidence that the term "located" in § 1348 includes branch banks.
See Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414, 424 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating
that identical words in unrelated statutes should be interpreted the same), cert.
granted, 125 S. Ct. 2904 (U.S. June 13, 2005) (No. 04-1186). However, the Fifth
and Seventh Circuits characterized this argument as weak because the two
statutes are in different acts. See Horton v. Bank One, N.A., 387 F.3d 426, 433-
34 (5th Cir. 2004); Faul, 253 F.3d at 990.
135. See Schmidt, 388 F.3d at 418-25.
136. See Horton, 387 F.3d at 429 (citing Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Bougas,
434 U.S. 35, 44 (1977)); Faul, 253 F.3d at 987 (citing Bougas, 434 U.S. at 44)).
137. See Bougas, 434 U.S. at 44. In Bougas, the Supreme Court concluded
that Congress's concern when enacting the venue statute was an interruption of
a national bank's business if forced to litigate in distant arenas. Id. The Court
went on to state that this concern "largely evaporates" when a national bank
has a branch in the venue where the litigation is taken place. Id.
138. See id.
139. See 2A SINGER, supra note 24, § 45:04.
140. Cf 2A id. § 46:04 (noting that where language of a statute is
ambiguous, the court may examine the scope, history, content, subject matter,
and object of the statute to discern legislative intent).
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of its principal place of business. 141  These courts relied
significantly on interpretations of § 1348's predecessors that
equated national banks with corporations for jurisdictional
purposes.142 Although the Fourth Circuit concluded that the
term "located" is unambiguous, it too addressed congressional
intent by analyzing § 1348's history and contrasting §
1332(c)(1)'s language. 4 3  However, for the reasons given
below, the Fourth Circuit's analysis is less persuasive than
that of the Fifth or Seventh Circuits.
1. The Historical Purpose of§ 1348
To determine Congress's intended meaning of ambiguous
words or phrases in a statute, courts may analyze whether
the words or phrases have achieved a settled meaning
through judicial interpretation.'" If a statute containing a
judicially interpreted phrase is later amended, but the
particular word or phrase remains, it is assumed that
Congress intended the statute to retain the judicially-
interpreted meaning. 45
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits used this principle as the
basis of their decisions. 46  In their view, the phrase
proclaiming that national banks shall "be deemed citizens of
the States in which they are respectively located" 47 in §
1348's predecessors had been interpreted by the courts as
providing citizenship to national banks in the same manner
as state banks and other corporations. 48  The courts found
141. See Horton, 387 F.3d at 429-31; Faul, 253 F.3d at 988-89.
142. See Horton, 387 F.3d at 429-31; Faul, 253 F.3d at 988-89.
143. See Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414, 425-31 (4th Cir.
2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 2904 (U.S. June 13, 2005) (No. 04-1186).
144. See Faul, 253 F.3d at 988.
145. See id. at 988. See also Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 389 (1943)
("We think if Congress had passed or intended to pass an Act challenging as
well known constitutional decision of this Court there would be at least one
clear statement of that purpose either from its proponents or its adversaries.").
146. See Horton, 387 F.3d at 429-31; Faul, 253 F.3d at 988-89.
147. 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (2000).
148. See Horton, 387 F.3d at 429-31; Faul, 253 F.3d at 988-89. In Leather
Manufacturers' Bank v. Cooper, 120 U.S. 778, 780 (1887), the Supreme Court
interpreted the Act of July 12, 1882, ch. 290, 22 Stat. 162 (1882) (current
version at 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (2000)), as establishing that national banks had the
same federal jurisdiction as state banks. See Cooper, 120 U.S. at 780. This
interpretation carried over into the Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552
(1887) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (2000)), which Petri v. Commercial
National Bank, 142 U.S. 644 (1892), interpreted as placing national banks and
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that because § 1348 had been amended in light of this judicial
interpretation without change, Congress intended to
maintain the jurisdictional parity between national banks
and corporations. 4
Conversely, the Fourth Circuit rejected this argument,
stating that § 1348 repealed any language of its predecessors
that equated national banks with state banks or corporations
for diversity purposes. 15 0  The court concluded that it would
be a "patently unreasonable interpretation" to assume
Congress was ratifying a parity principle when it had dropped
the parity language from the statute. 5' Moreover, the court
concluded that because Congress readopted the general term
"located" in 1943 after branch banking became authorized in
1927,152 it must not have intended to restrict the term to a
bank's principal place of business because it could have used
that express language, but did not do so.' 53
However, the Fourth Circuit did not address the
presumption that "Congress will use clear language if it
intends to alter an established understanding about what a
law means; if Congress fails to do so, courts presume that the
new statute has the same effect as the older version.
Without language in the statute to rebut the presumption
that § 1348 has the same effect as its predecessors, the
Fourth Circuit's conclusion that Congress did not intend to
adopt any parity principal between national banks and
corporations on the same footing for the purposes of federal jurisdiction. See
Petri, 142 U.S. at 650-51.
149. See Faul, 253 F.3d at 988-89 ("Thus we assume that Congress intended
these words to have the same meaning as was given them in Petri, which
provided national banks were to be treated the same as any other corporation
for diversity purposes.") (citation omitted).
150. See Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 388 F.3d 414, 428 (4th Cir. 2004),
cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 2904 (U.S. June 13, 2005) (No. 04-1186). The Fourth
Circuit stated that the Act of 1882 was "couched in terms of jurisdictional
parity" between national banks and state banks. Id.
151. Id.
152. See Act of Feb. 25, 1927, Pub. L. No. 639, § 7, 44 Stat. 1228 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 36 (2000)) (providing Congressional authorization of
branch banking).
153. See Schmidt, 388 F.3d at 421 ("Congress was aware of this change,
having effected the change itself. Because, in reenacting section 1348, Congress
did not specify 'principal' or 'branch' location, but instead retained the general
term 'located,' history reveals.., that Congress ... did intend to bring branch
offices within the scope of the section.").
154. See Faul, 253 F.3d at 988 (citing Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S.
554, 562 (1991); NBD Bank, N.A. v. Bennett, 67 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 1995)).
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corporations when it enacted § 1348 lacks merit. 15
2. The Consideration of§ 1332(c)(1)
In addition to the Fourth Circuit's reasoning that the
statutory history of § 1348 does not support congressional
intent to equate national banks and corporations for
jurisdictional purposes, 156 the court also relied on § 1332(c)(1)
in concluding that Congress intended for national banks to be
citizens of every state in which a branch is located.157 It
stated that had it been Congress's intention to equate
national banks and corporations for diversity jurisdiction, it
would have adopted similar language to that espoused in §
1332(c)( 1).158
The weakness in this argument lies in the fact that the
purpose of § 1348 was not necessarily to make a national
bank a citizen of the state of its principal place of business, as
the Fourth Circuit suggests. 15 9 Rather, it equated national
banks with corporations for jurisdictional purposes."6°
Therefore, if § 1332(c)(1) had instead made a corporation a
citizen of every state in which it operated any part of its
business, a national bank would be a citizen of every state in
which it operates a branch. This would be done to maintain
the jurisdictional parity between national banks and
corporations. As long as a corporation's citizenship for
155. See Schmidt, 388 F.3d at 431. The Fourth Circuit also reasoned that
the judicial interpretation of § 1348's predecessors had been misinterpreted
because Petri only addressed whether the Act of March 3, 1887, completely
abolished diversity jurisdiction for national banks. See id. at 429-30 (citing
Petri v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 142 U.S. 644, 649-50 (1892)). However, this
reasoning is also unpersuasive. In American Surety Co. v. Bank of California,
133 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1943), the Ninth Circuit held that the predecessor of §
1348 maintained the jurisdictional parity between national banks and
corporations because Congress would have made clear its intent to depart from
this general rule. Am. Sur. Co., 133 F.2d at 162. Thus, had Congress disagreed
with the Ninth Circuit that Petri established parity between national banks and
corporations as the general rule, it would have reflected this in its enactment of
§ 1348. See Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 389 (1943).
156. See Schmidt, 388 F.3d at 421, 425-29.
157. See id. at 431.
158. See id. Because Congress did not make an explicit provision for the
singular or dual citizenship of a national bank as it had when it adopted the
language in § 1332(c) ten years later, Congress did not intend to adopt the
parity relationship between national banks and corporations for diversity
purposes. See id.
159. See id.
160. See Firstar Bank, N.A. v. Faul, 253 F.3d 982, 988 (7th Cir. 2001).
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diversity jurisdiction remains clear, there is no need for
Congress to enact a statute with language similar to §
1332(c)(1) for national banks.
V. PROPOSAL
The circuit split over whether a national bank is a citizen
of every state in which it operates a branch will be resolved
by the Supreme Court in its October 2005 term. 6 ' This
comment proposes an interpretation of § 1348 that would
solve the problems identified above. In addition, it also
proposes that "established" be interpreted to refer to the state
listed in the articles of association. These proposed
interpretations maintain the parity relationship between
national banks and corporations that prior judicial
interpretations established and that Congress intended to
ratify in § 1348.162
The Fifth and Seventh Circuit decisions provided strong,
well-founded rationales for their conclusions that the term
"located" in § 1348 is ambiguous. 163 Indeed, contrary to the
Fourth Circuit, both adhered to the Supreme Court's
admonition in Bougas that the term "located" has "no
enduring rigidity," thus rendering it ambiguous. 6 4 As such,
the legislative intent behind § 1348 must control its
meaning.1 65
Congressional intent can be inferred because Congress
clearly enacted § 1348 against a judicially interpreted
background, establishing that the purpose of the statute was
to place national banks and corporations on the same footing
without any relevant change in its language. 166 The context
of § 1348's enactment demonstrates that Congress intended
to ratify the parity relationship.167 When and if Congress
161. Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 125 S. Ct. 2904 (U.S. June 13, 2005)
(No. 04-1186).
162. See 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (2000); Petri v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 142 U.S.
644, 650-51 (1892).
163. See Horton v. Bank One, N.A., 387 F.3d 426, 429-30 (5th Cir. 2004);
Faul, 253 F.3d at 987.
164. See Horton, 387 F.3d at 429; Faul, 253 F.3d at 987; see also discussion
supra Part IV.A.1.
165. See 2A SINGER, supra note 24, § 45:05.
166. Compare Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 4, 24 Stat. 552, 554, with 28
U.S.C. § 1348 (2000).
167. See generally Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 389 (1943) (stating
that if Congress intended to pass an act challenging a well-known decision of
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determines that equal footing is no longer appropriate, it will
expressly make its intent clear.1
68
However, until Congress repeals this established
purpose, the goal of jurisdictional parity between a national
bank and a corporation is best served if the term "located" is
defined as a national bank's principal place of business, and
"established" is defined as the state listed in its articles of
association. This proposal follows from the Fourth Circuit's
observation that "established" refers to an original and
permanent location.169 In the case of corporations, their
original and permanent location is likely their state of
incorporation.'10 If used in the context of a national bank,
"established" must refer to the state listed in its articles of
association because such documents must always reflect the
current location of the bank's main office. 17
Moreover, other than a corporation's state of
incorporation, its citizenship for diversity jurisdiction is
determined by its principal place of business. 2 As such, to
further maintain the parity relationship between national
banks and corporations, the term "located" in § 1348 must be
defined as a national bank's principal place of business. This
proposal solves the conflicting views of the various circuits in
a way that keeps with the legislature's intended purpose of
allowing national banks the same broad access to federal
courts that is enjoyed by state banks and other
the Court, there would at least be a clear statement of that purpose).
168. See id.
169. See Firstar Bank, N.A. v. Faul, 253 F.3d 982, 992 (stating that while not
at issue, the meaning of "established" traditionally meant the place specified in
the bank's charter).
170. Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Determination of Corporation's Principal
Place of Business for Purposes of Diversity Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C.A. §
1332(c), 6 A.L.R. FED. 436 (2004). Prior to the addition of subsection (c) to 28
U.S.C. § 1332 in 1958, establishing that a corporation is deemed a citizen of
both the state if its incorporation and the state of its principal place of business,
a private corporation was a citizen of the state of its incorporation only. Id.
171. See Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 50, at 2 ("The location of a
national bank for corporate status purposes under the National Bank Act and
other banking laws is determined by the place where the national bank's main
office is located .... [I] f the bank changes the location of its main office to a new
place, the new location determines the location of the bank for corporate status
purposes. Such changes of location are evidenced in the bank's articles of
association . . ").
172. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2000).
228 [Vol: 46
2005] THE CITIZENSHIP OF NATIONAL BANKS
corporations. 173
VI. CONCLUSION
Although § 1348 purportedly codified a national bank's
citizenship for jurisdictional purposes,'74  differing
interpretations of § 1348 have caused courts to recognize
diversity jurisdiction inconsistently.175 Because of the varying
interpretations among the circuits, the Supreme Court must
determine the meaning intended by Congress. Based on the
historical backdrop against which the statute was re-
enacted, 7 6 the Supreme Court should define the term
"located" as a national bank's principal place of business and
the term "established" as the state listed in the bank's
articles of association.
177
173. See Petri v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 142 U.S. 644, 650-51 (1892).
174. See 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (2000).
175. See cases cited supra note 9.
176. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
177. See discussion supra Part V.
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